The second part of the paper explores in more detail four of the many issues that arise in looking at finance in East Asia. 3 The first of these is the need to integrate regional financial markets. The second is a discussion of the methods to pursue integration, including harmonisation, mutual recognition, and private insurance. It includes an analysis of the European experience and a practical case study, e-finance. The third issue is the respective roles of Japan and China in regional financial integration. Finally, Part 2 looks ahead at other issues to include in the policy and research agenda, such as an independent stocktake of capacity building and cooperation in finance and consideration of ways to more deeply include the private sector in this program.
FINANCIAL MARKETS AFTER THE CRISIS
The quality of infrastructure A well-functioning infrastructure is essential to financial markets development. The quality of infrastructure can be judged by a number of key factors: an effective legal framework, reliable accounting and disclosure standards, and an efficient and reliable clearing and settlement process, and reliable and easily accessible information (Herring and Chatusripitak 2000) .
How does East Asia perform? Based on La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Herring and Chatusripitak (2000) set out a collection of tables assessing countries by the quality of their financial infrastructure, creditor rights, judicial systems and information systems. These are replicated in Table 1 but broken down into the four relatively developed markets (Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia), six emerging markets (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand), and, as reference markets, the United Kingdom and the United States. Herring and Chatusripitak (2000) As set out in Herring and Chatusripitak (2000) , the quality indicators set out in Table 2 include contract realisation (the converse of the risk of contract modification through repudiation, postponement, or scaling down), lack of corruption (special payments or bribes to officials), rule of law (a tradition of law and order), bureaucratic quality, accounting standards (based on inclusion and omission of key items in a large sample of company reports), and press freedom (repressive actions and laws on the press). Press freedom is included because it gives business people and investors a sense of whether they can get full, reliable and easy access to information. These are qualitative subjective assessments. While the exact ordering may vary slightly, the general placement of ordering of economies is robust to the inclusion of other factors or exclusion of included factors.
The differences between markets are striking. The four developed markets of Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia stand out as the high quality markets, with Australia and Japan on a par with the quality of infrastructure in the UK and US financial markets. Singapore is disadvantaged by its relative lack of freedom of access to information. The emerging East Asian markets as a whole are substantially below developed market quality but there are three clear sets: Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand in the middle, and the Philippines and Indonesia at the bottom. This breakdown should come as no surprise. It largely matches sovereign debt ratings, as shown in Table 2 . There is room for improvement in all markets, and this is most compelling for the less well developed economies of the region. There is enormous scope for cooperation between countries in the region to build up capacity. 
Developments in financial markets

Stock markets
Given that they are relatively developed (compared to other financial markets in the region) and accessible by foreign investors, there is considerable focus on East Asia's stock markets. Regional stock markets have had a mixed performance in the post crisis period, although much of this reflects uncertainty caused elsewhere by the collapse of the US technology bubble and the effects of the US slowdown, terror attacks and war in Iraq. The region as a whole now comprises over 10 per cent of the global stock market indices; Table 3 show recent developments in the S&P Global Index. Japan tends to dominate the region but it is waning, with the South Korean and Australian markets recording the largest rises in index share over the past five years. Serious problems in market microstructure and efficiency also remain that impede solid recovery.
De Brouwer and Smiles (2002) , for example, examine differences in East Asian stock markets with other markets in the United Kingdom and United States. They report that there are substantial microstructural differences between East Asian equity markets and those elsewhere, especially in terms of size, number of stocks, extent of foreign listings, and trading hours. The US, Japanese and UK markets are the largest in terms of capitalisation, number of listed stocks, and market turnover. The Malaysian, Indonesian, Taiwanese and Thai markets tend to be at the lower end of the spectrum. The investor base is narrow in the equity markets of most economies in East Asia. These economies are associated with restricted and highly regulated contractual savings systems, underdeveloped mutual funds, a highly regulated asset management industry, and a limited role for insurance companies in capital markets. US and UK markets have higher proportions of listed foreign stocks, Japan has a substantially lower share of foreign stocks while Singapore has a very high share. Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan and Thailand have either no foreign listings or virtually no foreign listings. The markets also have diverse sectoral weightings, although these do not seem to be related to geography or level of development.
They also look at high-frequency (five-minute) equity returns in 2000. They report that price formation in East Asian equity markets differs from the major markets in two respects. First, market opening price variability is relatively larger in East Asian equity markets. It appears that much of the global price action that matters to equity markets occurs in New York and London, and all this information needs to be incorporated into domestic equity prices. This conforms with the general assessment that stock prices in East Asia are heavily influenced by developments in US markets, especially in the short term.
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The other key difference is in the level of relative market efficiency. The weak-form test of market efficiency -testing whether past returns contain information about current and future movements in returns -does not hold in any equity market on high frequency data like five-minute returns.
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But past information matters considerably less for the large US and UK markets than for all equity 4 See, for example, de Brouwer (2002) and Park (2002). 5 This is tested by including past 30 minute, hourly and daily returns and variances in GARCH(1,1) specifications of 5-minute changes in regional equity prices. markets in East Asia, including Japan but apart from Singapore. At one extreme, for example, information beyond one hour is irrelevant for US, UK, Hong Kong and Singaporean stocks. At the other extreme, only information beyond five days is irrelevant for China's Shanghai A (domestic) stocks. This is a substantial gap, with the other East Asian equity markets lying somewhere in between. There is still room for development in East Asian equity markets, including in longer trading hours and wider foreign listing and participation in stock markets.
Foreign exchange markets
Almost a quarter of the world's foreign exchange market activity takes place in East Asia, but this is highly concentrated in the regional financial centres in Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia (Table 4) . 6 Most trading in Hong Kong and Singapore is in G-3 currencies, not the local currency. (1996, 1999, 2002a) A notable feature of these markets is increased concentration among the firms doing foreign exchange business, although this is also characteristic of other foreign exchange markets like that in the United States, and reflects narrowing margins, increased competition, and the global 6 The Singapore figures for foreign exchange trading are regarded by some as artificially high. Sheng (2001 Sheng ( , 2002 argues that the limited foreign exchange trading in much of East Asia shows the region's lack of financial sophistication and influence. consolidation of financial institutions. The concentration of activity has increased and the number of players in the markets has generally declined, in some cases very substantially (Table 5 ).
The fact that Japan has the most foreign exchange market activity in East Asia does not mean that much of the trading activity in the region is done directly in the yen. The dollar-yen is the second most common transaction in foreign exchange markets, after the dollar-euro. 7 But there is very little direct trade of local East Asian currencies with the yen. As shown in Table 6 , local East Asian currency trade with the yen is largely done indirectly, through local currency-dollar and dollar-yen trades (and vice versa). Daily average turnover in 2001 of domestic currency trade in non-Japan East Asia with the dollar was $77,084 million, compared to $630 million with the yen and $455 million with the euro. A minuscule 0.3 per cent of local-currency foreign-exchange transactions in East Asian countries are done with the yen as the direct counterpart. For Southeast Asia, the value of direct yen foreign currency trade has even fallen over time. 
Bond markets
It is generally accepted that bond markets in East Asia are poorly developed. This reflects a number of factors, namely borrower and lender preference for bank intermediation and generally low government debt associated with a strong policy aversion for fiscal deficits. The decline in directed lending in the 1990s and the severe recessions of the past few years have changed this in many countries. There are now many calls for developing broad and deep bond markets in East Asia.
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The argument is straightforward: a broader set of financing provides greater opportunity for riskpooling and risk-sharing for borrowers and lenders, boosting financial and economic efficiency and reducing individual and collective risk.
But with only a few exceptions, notably Australia, Singapore and Japan, regional bond markets in East Asia, especially corporate bond markets, are weak and poorly developed. The development of government bond markets also depends on the degree to which institutions, like banks, insurance companies and pension funds, are forced to acquire bonds and thereby finance government See, for example, Herring and Chatusripitak (2000) and Asian Policy Forum (2001). spending or obligations. Generally, forced acquisition of government securities retards market development because it hinders the growth of secondary markets.
Derivatives markets
Derivatives, including swaps, forwards and options, are an essential part of risk management for firms, financial institutions and governments. Table 7 provides a snapshot of the depth of derivatives markets in East Asia. As for foreign exchange trading, derivatives trading is concentrated in the region's financial centres -Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia. Over the counter derivatives trading elsewhere in the region is negligible, and reflects the limited ability of firms and households to manage financial risk. The region largely holds its own in terms of foreign exchange derivatives: East Asia's share of foreign exchange derivatives was about 24 per cent in April 2001, on par with its share of world foreign exchange trading. But East Asia is particularly weak when it comes to interest-rate derivatives, with only 4.7 per cent of the world market. These derivatives are simple -only 6 per cent are options with the rest just swaps (68 per cent) and forwards (26 per cent). They are largely concentrated in US dollar interest rates; yen interest rate derivatives have been declining. There is a striking difference between regional financial centres in this regard, with Australia standing out in relative strength ( Figure 1 ). The general implication from the low interest rate derivatives activity is that East Asia is poorly developed in its financial risk management.
Financial reform
Financial systems in East Asia are dominated by banks. Bank finance provides the bulk of corporate sources of funding and the majority of household assets are held in the form of bank deposits. These features create special difficulties when systems are faced with crisis and can cause political barriers to rapid reform. East Asian financial systems have made mixed progress in reform with the risk that weak banking systems may remain a constraint on economic growth and efficiency.
Key indicators of the extent of change in the systems are:
• Ownership indicators such as changes in the degree of concentration, and in the extent of public and foreign ownership in the banking system.
• Financial soundness indicators such as the proportion of non-performing loans, and capital ratios in the banking sector • Indicators of the ability of the system to deal with weakness, such as the number of corporations that have been "restructured" or closed and the numbers which still have inadequate interest coverage and/or "excessive" levels of debt.
Recent and consistent data are not easy to come by but some features of post-crisis banking systems are emerging. While it may seem plausible that high concentration ratios in banking would restrict competition and hamper performance, some theoretical and empirical arguments suggest that the benefits in efficiency from concentration may offset the costs, leaving the impact of concentration on bank performance marginal.
9 Before the crisis the five crisis-affected countries were, in any case, not particularly highly concentrated. Thailand, the most concentrated, had only 47 per cent of banking assets held by the three largest banks compared to a 99-country average of 72 per cent. As a result of bank closures, mergers and recapitalisations these rates may now be somewhat higher but there is no clear policy implication from the result.
What is clear is the governments' share of ownership in banking systems has increased. Here the range is very wide, running from 72 per cent of all banking assets held by the state in Indonesia in 2000 to 18 per cent in Malaysia, with Korea (58 per cent) and Thailand (30 per cent) in a middle range (Kawai 2002) . At the same time the asset share of foreign banks remains very small by international standards (Clarke et al. 2001) . While evidence on the impact of ownership structures on banking performance is generally inconclusive Barth et al. (2000) report that government ownership is associated with a more poorly operating banking system. Foreign entry, however, is associated with reduced profitability and margins for domestic banks, consistent with increased competitive effects (Claessens et al. 2001 ).
In the crisis-affected economies, there has been some improvement in bank soundnesss by measures to remove bad loans off bank balance sheets and by public recapitalisations. In some countries centralised asset management vehicles have been used while in others, notably Thailand, banks have been required to do this themselves. While non-performing loans (NPLs) generally remain high they have fallen steadily. The ADB estimates that NPLs have fallen in most crisis-affected economies, with, for example, Malaysia falling from 15 per cent of loans at end-1999 to 10. See Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) . This is also the source for the figures quoted in this paragraph.
problems in China and Japan. The FSA in Japan reckons that NPLs in its banks rose to about 7½ per cent of bank loans at September 2001. Private sector estimates are more than twice that. Banking systems are strong in Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia. Direct measures of banking sector health, such as capital asset ratios, suggest there is further to go for most East Asian countries.
The impact of interventions in banks should also be visible in corporate restructurings if real economic reform is to be achieved. Data are slow to emerge so that there is no clear picture of postcrisis performance in this regard. Most countries have achieved some improvements in the legal infrastructure supporting corporate bankruptcies and restructuring but ADB (1999) data show that even among the crisis 5 countries there is a wide range in bankruptcy codes and in the efficiency and speed of the judicial system and creditor rights (see Claessens et al. forthcoming) . The range must be even wider across the region as a whole. Institutional improvement since the crisis has also been varied (Kawai 2002 ) so that some countries still have much to achieve. Evidence from the crisis period itself shows that bankruptcy filings are more likely in countries with efficient judicial systems and strong creditor rights (Claessens et al. forthcoming) . Elsewhere corporate restructurings have to be achieved outside of court systems, which may sometimes be cheaper but is usually less transparent and can require the intervention of a strong creditor institution. Where the institutions themselves are weak the process can be even further delayed.
Financial systems in most of East Asia are bank-based. There is substantial scope for expanding the range of domestic institutions, including local institutional investors.
10 Table 8 shows the relative size of local mutual funds, or open-ended investment companies, in East Asia. This class of institutional investor, typical of many developed markets, is relatively small in much of East Asia, especially in comparison to the size of bank deposits. East Asia is over-banked and under-uses institutional investors, at a cost to the development, liquidity, and efficiency of its financial markets and the governance and risk management of its business sectors. There is also scope to make wider use of foreign financial and human capital in developing regional markets. Foreign firms are an important conduit for the transfer of financial skill and technology. It does not mean that they should be allowed unfettered access to a market. Solid supervision and market-consistent regulation are essential.
There is a general concern that the entry of foreign institutions and managers in the domestic financial system means a loss of control and sovereignty. So long as effective domestic supervision is in place, a greater role for foreigners does not necessarily mean a loss of control. The risk of loss of sovereignty also tends to be overstated. In the first place, there are very few instances of where 10 This argument is also raised by Sheng (2001 Sheng ( , 2002 .
countries financial systems have become substantially foreign-owned. New Zealand stands out as an exception but most of the foreign banks being Australian owned; given the relative size of the two economies and the deep integration of the Australian and New Zealand, economies, societies and polities, this is hardly surprising. It is actually very hard for foreign institutions to break into retail banking because incumbents enjoy structural advantages in the domestic market, such as established branch network and name recognition. It is also the case that foreign management increases after a crisis, as firms search beyond the local pool of talent, but this tends to be a temporary phenomenon.
Capital flows and cross-border banking
The financial crises in 1997 and 1998 led to a tumultuous shift in gross and net capital flows to East Asia which still persists in 2002. These flows have been also been affected by the extent of financial reform in regional markets and institutions. Consider net capital flows. Figure 2 shows net private capital flows to the five crisis-affected East Asian economies, 11 taken from the IMF's March 2002 Global Financial Stability Report. Reflecting their current account surpluses, these countries are net providers of international capital. While FDI and portfolio investment flow into these countries on a net basis, they are still paying back cross-border loans.
As shown in Figure 3 , other emerging East Asian economies are also paying back international loans, but in their case the inward portfolio investment is sufficiently large as to dominate these net outflows and make them net importers of international capital (as would seem 'right' for emerging markets). The net repayment of loans is also seen in the cross-border assets of BIS reporting banks. Table 9 shows exchange-rate adjusted changes in banks' cross-border loans in selected East Asian economies. There are three points to note. First, the fall in cross-border loans has been monumental: about $264 billion has been pulled out of these economies in the past five years, with $78.5 billion from Thailand, $63.9 billion from Korea and, accelerated by the ITIC collapses in 1999, $52.5 billion from China. The bulk has come in the collapse of loans from Japan, which was previously the main creditor to emerging East Asia (Figures 4 and 5) , due to the weakness of the Japanese banking system. The consolidated claims of Japanese banks on emerging economies and offshore financial centres in East Asia have fallen from a peak of $383 billion in June 1995 to $99.5 billion in June 2002, making UK banks the biggest lenders in the region. In June 2002, US bank assets in East Asia exceeded those of Japan's banks for the first time since statistics were collected in 1983. When loans to offshore financial centres are excluded, the United States features as the biggest provider of bank funds to emerging East Asia ( Figure 5 ). The contraction of Japanese bank assets has been widespread in the region, but biggest in the case of Thailand, where Japanese banks' assets have fallen from a peak of $39.7 billion in June 1997 to a low of $10.3 billion in June 2002 ( Figure 6 ). This is part of a broader pattern of decline of Japanese banks in international finance (BIS 2002c). 12 Second, the decline in cross-border loans to emerging East Asia looks like it is slowing down. Loans to Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan actually increased in 2001, and the rate of decline is slowing for the others, with the possible exception of Indonesia which remains subject to substantial political uncertainty.
Third, China and South Korea are the main recipients of bank loans from other countries. The decline in Japanese loans to East Asia has been relatively less severe in the case of loans to China than for most other countries. Japanese banks now have more cross-border loans in China ($10.1 billion) than elsewhere in emerging East Asia except Thailand ($10.3 billion) (Figure 6 ), 12 Jeanneau and Micu (2002) trace the shifts in cross-border lending to push and pull, internal and external factors like high domestic real interest rates, bilateral trade, emerging economy economic growth, bilateral exchange rate volatility, external debt (to GDP), and risk aversion -although this last factor looks circular: what explains risk aversion?
reflecting the growing importance of China as a destination for Japanese and other foreign capital. The implication for ASEAN is stark: Southeast Asia faces a serious challenge from China not only in attracting FDI and portfolio investment, but also bank finance. 
ISSUES
There are many issues that warrant serious discussion with respect to financial integration, markets and institutions in East Asia. Here, we consider four. 
The Need to Integrate Regional Financial Markets
Much of the focus on finance in East Asia since the crises of 1997 and 1998 has been on institutional development, especially in repairing the banking and supervisory systems of many of the affected and other economies. The ongoing depth of the NPL problem and the weak structure of banks in East Asia suggest that this has been right and needs to continue. But, as shown above, East Asia is also relatively weak in terms of its financial markets.
The ability of the region to attract international funds and financial expertise is being made more difficult by changes going on elsewhere in the world. The introduction of the euro is having a substantial effect on the development, structure and integration of financial regulations, instruments and institutions in the euro area. 14 The consolidation of trading, clearing and settlement in the European Union is expected to reduce clearing and settlement costs by around $1 billion a year.
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European financial markets are becoming more harmonised and, as a result, bigger and more efficient. The Americas are dominated by the US dollar and US regulations and market practices. Many institutions in the Americas are dollarised and focus on US standards, even if they are outside the United States. In a world where everyone else is integrating, it is harder for a yet-to-beintegrated East Asia to remain relevant in global finance.
As cross-border trade and economic activity in East Asia increases and economies themselves become more deeply integrated and enmeshed with each other, it is reasonable to expect that this will flow over to cross-border financial activity. Weakness in individual country's financial markets and institutions will impede economic and financial integration.
It is usual to talk about financial integration in global not regional terms, 16 and so some explanation of the gains from regional financial integration is warranted. There are three potential advantages for East Asia from focusing on regional financial integration.
The first advantage is that it creates a set of powerful internal pressures for financial reform and development in East Asia. East Asia is seeking ways to promote regional integration. The region is not strong in finance. The only way that a regional policy agenda on finance will succeed is if there is concerted internal and external pressure for financial reform and development. This means that much of the regional focus on financial integration will be on development and capacity building. East Asia does have the resources to pursue this. As argued in de , the four or so most developed financial centres in the region -Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Australiashould both cooperate with each other to better integrate their own markets and, at the same time, work closely with the rest of the region in encouraging stable financial liberalisation and upgrading capacity. Of course, regional dialogue and cooperation with countries outside the region, especially the United States, and with private market participants is also essential to achieving full financial development.
The second advantage is that the integration of financially developed markets and systems in East Asia provides opportunities to improve access to, widen the range of, and reduce the costs associated with financial services and instruments available to households and firms in East Asia. This deepens the pool of funds in the region and makes it easier for the region's own large pool of funds to be allocated efficiently within the region. This does not mean that the region has to impose its own standards, forsake integration with the rest of the world, or withdraw into itself. This ultimately be sub-optimal and self-defeating. Indeed, it would likely fail from the start since global interaction, especially with the United States, is essential for almost all of East Asia.
The third advantage is that regional financial cooperation and integration should also provide East Asia with a stronger voice in global forums and greater influence in global policymaking.
17 Sheng (2001) argues for greater institutional development to discuss and progress cooperation. Grenville (2000; argues that greater regional policy dialogue and cooperation are important because they provide the region with influence over global rules setting. These matters cannot just be left to America or Europe. East Asia needs a voice but the only way that it will have influence is if it has strong financial markets and institutions. Rules-setting is not over -and never is -because financial markets are dynamic and fluid. The region has been slow in the past to respond to this challenge but the rise of networks governed by technology means that the markets and regulations that structure them remain contestable. The ASEAN+3 framework is likely evolve as the key vehicle for this. The difficulty here is that ASEAN+3 does not fully capture the region's financial expertise since it excludes Australia and Hong Kong (even though the latter is part of China).
Methods of Integration: Harmonisation, Mutual Recognition and Insurance
There are three basic models for regulating cross-border financial services.
18 First, governments can engage in full harmonisation, in which the participating countries adopt the same set of rules. Second, governments can agree upon a system of mutual recognition, which requires weak harmonisation as a basis, but leaves more discretion to the individual governments. Finally, private insurance can be used in lieu of formal legal systems, to create a system of self-regulation of financial services firms.
Each of these models has benefits and difficulties in terms of both efficacy and their ability to ensure consumer protection aims.
Harmonisation
The harmonisation approach requires the development of laws or treaties that govern activity in each of the members of a regional group.. Understandably, this approach is in many ways the most difficult of the three regulatory models, as it requires implementation by all of the national governments involved.
Harmonisation approaches can be distinguished from one another, depending on their level of rigour. Both "minimal" and "full" harmonisation schemes may fall into this category. In minimal harmonisation regimes, the states involved decide on a minimum set of standards, leaving it up to individual countries to adopt more extensive regulations if desired. Full harmonisation leaves less open to chance at the national level, and imposes a higher set of standards.
The drawbacks involved with the harmonisation model focus on the difficulties of enacting appropriate rules that are accepted and enforced by all participating countries. Negotiating legislative tools at the international level is a complicated, time-consuming, and costly project, and not necessarily one that governments are ready and willing to enter into. On the one hand, if such a set of rules is actually negotiated, their potential to provide a predictable wide-ranging and widely understood regulatory regime is relatively high. On the other hand, harmonisation removes the competitive market pressure of regulatory arbitrage on countries, which forces them to be responsive to developments elsewhere and maintain 'best practice'. But given that we are talking 17 See Sheng (2001 Sheng ( , 2002 and Grenville (2003) .
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See Strasser (2003) . about harmonisation at the regional level, competitive pressures from the United States and elsewhere will still remain.
Mutual recognition
The mutual recognition model is similar to harmonisation in that it relies on the state for its enforcement. While harmonisation requires participating countries to adopt laws containing the same standards and regulations, mutual recognition provides for each state to recognise minimum standards for firms, allowing governments to assume that financial services firms in other countries have met certain quality and other requirements.
It is based on the notion of home country control. In other words, the firm's home country is responsible for regulating its activities, and must abide by certain minimum standards set by the countries as a group; other countries must recognise the validity of the home country's approach. 19 The main benefit of the mutual recognition model is its relative informality, at least compared with full harmonisation schemes. On the other hand the EU experience with the Investment Services Directive shows that these systems can encounter problems and that eventually deeper harmonisation may be necessary. On a more general level, mutual recognition schemes are open to the danger that consumers will only be able to rely upon the lightest of regulatory regimes, and that the nature of consumer protection will thus fall to the lowest common denominator.
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The best existing example of a mutual recognition system applied to financial services is in the European Union, where the model has been applied directly to the problem of cross-border business-to-consumer financial services. 21 The European Union has adopted a number of Directives in the financial services area based on the notion of mutual recognition. These Directives provide that authorisation in one Member State to provide banking or investment financial services, serves as authorisation to provide those same services in any other Member State, subject to compliance with the provisions of those Directives. The services enjoying mutual recognition under this regime include the provision of investment services, including securities brokerage and underwriting, and dealing in over-the-counter financial derivatives. The European Union first moved towards a mutual recognition approach in 1979 in the case of Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (commonly referred to as "Cassis de Dijon"), in which the European Court of Justice established a principle based on the freedom of goods between Member States, that if goods could legally be marketed in a Member State, then they also could be exported into and sold in another Member State, unless restricted by a specific provision in the EC Treaty or a requirement justified in the general good. This holding mean that Member States should respect the adequacy of other Member States' laws with respect to the marketing of products. States without additional scrutiny. This directive was a first step towards reciprocal recognition of financial services rules in the European Union.
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The Investment Services Directive (the "ISD") was a further step in this direction. The ISD applies generally to any firms in the business of providing investment services, including brokerage, dealing, market making, portfolio management, securities underwriting, and individual investment advice. 24 Other Directives also provide mutual recognition for financial services within the European Union.
Deeper harmonisation is the better alternative. However, there is also a case to be made for less formal assurances for consumers. Legislation touching upon developing technologies suffers from the danger that it will be obsolete by the time it is effective. The European Commission admits that technological and other developments have caused the ISD to be outdated very rapidly:
The ISD, pivotal to the integration of the investment services market, was nevertheless designed in 1992 for an era when the underlying securities and money markets were heavily fragmented by exchange risk and where national exchanges were the uncontested point of liquidity for local securities. Now national exchanges are facing increased competition in their core business from alternative trading systems and globalisation. Markets are pressing for European-level consolidation of clearing and settlement and retail investors are increasingly seeking to trade securities directly for their own account.
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The Financial Services Policy Group of the Commission has argued that revision of the ISD should focus on cross-border provision of investment services, taking account of competition with traditional exchanges from electronic trading alternatives, and the difficulties presented by the consolidation of clearing and settlement procedures.
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Alternative dispute resolution, Quality assurance standards and Private insurance
The answer to the problems of mutual recognition is not necessarily full harmonisation, but may in fact be less harmonisation. The least formal of the regulatory models considered here is not strictly "regulation" at all, but rather a reliance on private contracting between firms, or self-regulation. This may involve third parties providing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or providing "kite marking" and quality assurance schemes. Alternatively, by obtaining insurance for individual transactions, banks and brokerage companies may be able to create a transnational market for financial services. Financial services firms would be responsible for obtaining private insurance for their services, such that the participating governments would allow these firms to do business on a cross-border basis. However the mechanism for creating a standard accepted by the governments is unclear, and may run into the same problems met by full harmonisation and mutual recognition approaches.
The most well-developed example of attempts to integrate regulatory approaches is the experience of the EU. With respect to financial services, the European Union's first approach was to regulate through a strong harmonisation approach. When this method was not fully successful, a mutual recognition scheme through the use of Directives was adopted. The efficacy of the current scheme is currently under review; some have even suggested that returning to a full harmonisation approach would be advisable. 27 In the European Union, the mutual recognition model requires some minimum standard harmonisation. Otherwise there is no guarantee that the laws enacted by each Member State, and recognised by other states as a result of mutual recognition, reflect the goals of the European Union. Furthermore, minimal harmonisation allows the responsibility for enforcement of standards to lie with the firm's "home country". As a result, Directives that establish mutual recognition schemes (in the field of financial services or elsewhere) tend to provide some level of harmonisation as a basis for implementation.
28 (See Appendix A for details).
A Practical Example
The rapidly developing field of electronic finance provides an example of the way in which regional solutions to particular policy problems may be essential and also points to the models which are available to achieve those solutions. The use of the internet and other electronic formats to deliver financial services has spread rapidly over the last five years. This has been true for the delivery of both domestic and cross-border (international) financial services. While e-finance is estimated to increase efficiency and reduce costs in financial systems it also poses some particular regulatory problems. There is evidence that internet trading systems may increase volatility in markets. Barber and Odean (2001) conjecture that rapid development of online trading might have contributed to the "Internet bubble" that burst in the United States in 2000. A large proportion of inexperienced traders, large uncertainty about the future value of the security, and availability of liquidity have contributed to mispricing many "dot com" securities.
There are also real concerns about consumer protection in the area of B2C electronic transactions where security issues are wide-ranging and where "asymmetric information" problems can be very significant. These problems are further exacerbated when e-finance transactions are conducted across borders because it is frequently unclear where regulatory jurisdiction lies. This is particularly the case for the enforcement of the range of consumer protection-related regulations because financial service providers do not fall within the easy control of the supervisory authorities in the host country when they do not have a "physical presence". In the case of compensation arrangements, if service providers operating on a cross-border basis are not subject to host country regulation, national authorities are not likely to extend compensation coverage for customers and investors dealing with them.
These regulatory issues run the risk of becoming particularly challenging in the Asian region because of the diversity of levels of penetration of e-finance and because of an enormous variation in the regulatory approaches. The extent of domestic ICT development varies widely in the region (Sidorenko and Findlay 2001) and penetration of online banking and brokerage transactions is generally at a low level except in Korea (Claessens et al. 2002) these commitments is the explicit recognition that making progress within an environment of diverse cross-country systems will require some management.
At present the regulatory structures within East Asia which relate to e-finance and, in particular to consumer protection and to the provision of cross-border e-finance services diverge greatly. Corbett and Sidorenko (2003) document the range of experience for the APEC 15 member economies. By constructing indices capturing three areas (general laws relating to e-finance, laws relating to consumer protection and information on the operation of private sector initiatives affecting consumer protection in e-finance 29 ) they show that there is a considerable distance between member economies in the level of readiness to support open cross-border e-finance. Table 10 provides a summary. Countries tend to cluster in three or four groups with Australia, Canada, the United States and South Korea in one constellation, middle sized APEC economies in one or two groupings together and the developing member economies in a group together. They argue that Japan does not naturally make a model for the developing economy markets. Its legal structure and approach to privacy protection issues leave it a long way from the group of other developed markets. Source: Corbett and Sidorenko (2003) .
At the heart of the divergence across the region is a lack of consistent approach to new financial developments within countries. Many countries have simply tried to extend existing financial 29 1. General laws relating to e-commerce, e-finance and cross-border finance: digital contract law, digital signature law, whether these laws were UNCITRAL based, whether there was a separate law for e-finance (or whether e-finance was handled within existing banking law),whether there was a separate e-finance regulator, whether a special licence was required for providers of on-line banking, and whether there were specific laws on cross-border finance. Laws relating to consumer protection: the existence of data protection law, privacy law, general consumer protection law; separate law on consumer protection in e-commerce, separate law on consumer protection in e-finance; whether there is a consumer protection agency; whether there are specific prohibitions on unsolicited selling on the Internet or on sending of spam.
2. Information on the operation of private sector initiatives affecting consumer protection in e-finance: codes of practice for banking/e-banking, systems to handle consumer complaints, trust mark schemes, formal dispute resolution mechanisms, ADRs, consumer education programs, separate enforcement agency, MOUs for international co-operation of regulators legislation and regulatory mechanisms to cover e-finance in a "technology neutral" way. The difficulty is that, as noted above, the starting point in many sectors already involves fundamental incompatibilities between systems based on very different legal systems. A key issue which is raised by this situation is how to structure policy responses towards actual or potential cross-border e-finance transactions which go wrong. Without some agreement on regulatory responses it will be difficult to encourage open liberal systems, and the development of e-finance based transactions will be hampered because of lack of confidence. There have already been a number of examples of scams and scandals that have highlighted the shortcomings of the current level of regulatory cooperation. 30 The fundamental issues also go beyond those of e-finance to the wider range of international financial transactions.
The Role of Japan and China
While a successful process of harmonisation and mutual recognition will involve all participants, it is natural to ask which countries will provide leadership for this process. In principle, the natural focus for financial integration in East Asia is Japan. While China's economy is perhaps bigger than Japan's economy on a PPP basis, 31 Japan's financial markets, institutions and system are easily the largest in the region. Japan is also a vocal supporter of enhanced regional integration and financial development in East Asia.
Yet there are concerns about Japan's capacity to provide strong leadership in regional financial development and integration. These stem primarily from the fundamental weakness of Japan's financial institutions, including its banks, insurance companies and pension funds. The sharp fall of Japanese banks' cross-border loans to the rest of East Asia over the past five years has weakened domestic financial institutions and reduced the liquidity in financial markets in the region. This has diminished Japan's authority. 32 What the region really wants from Japan is for it to get its economic and financial house in order.
There are other three factors also at work which impede Japan's position.
The first impediment is that Japan's legal framework differs to many other key financially developed economies in the region, notably Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia and Malaysia, all of which share a common law legal tradition. Japan's legal system is based on US systems, similar to South Korea and, increasingly, China. This difference is a problem for harmonisation: who harmonises on whom? Does size matter or does the number of countries with common systems matter? It also means that it is possible that harmonisation within East Asia will be bifurcated, with Northeast Asian systems more similar to US systems and Southeast Asian systems more similar to UK systems.
This difference also has implications for mutual recognition. Consider a specific example. Cooperation to link regional stock markets is progressing. In one form of this, the Australian and Singaporean stock exchanges set up a mechanism in December 2001 by which investors use their local exchange to access and buy stocks in the other exchange, with their local exchange acting as 30 See Corbett and Sidorenko (2003) and the APEC EFITS Working Group Final Report for details of some examples.
31
The World Bank estimates that China's economy was US$501.9 billion on a PPP basis in 2000, compared to US$339.4 billion for Japan. This corresponds to US$3,976 per capita for China and US$26,755 for Japan. On a current exchange rate basis, China was US$1,079.8 billion in 2000 and Japan was US$4,454.6 billion.
32
In a number of recent conversations, senior official from North and South East Asia noted the seriousness of Japan's financial sector problems and incapacity to deal with them. They then said that they no longer regard Japan as a model for financial development. intermediary and trustee. This enables domestic investors -be it the householder or the institutional investor -to access foreign stocks, boosting both investment opportunities and the potential supply of funds. The Japan-Singapore New Age Economic Agreement provides for both those countries to do the same thing. The Australian and Tokyo exchanges are also discussing a similar arrangement, which would close the triangle. Participation by Hong Kong and others could follow. The problem with Japan in these arrangements is that Japan can only half deliver. Japanese, like US, securities law prohibits foreign securities being offered locally unless they are registered, and registration is an involved process akin to listing on the local exchange. Under the process outlined above, Singaporeans can invest in Japanese stocks but, unless there is reform of the securities law, Japanese cannot invest in Singaporean stocks. There is no such regulatory impediment between Australia and Singapore. At present, Japan does not appear to be prepared to change its laws.
The second impediment is that, while much bigger, Japan's markets are less sophisticated than other developed financial markets in the region. They are, for example, more likely to be paper-based than electronic. Oddly for such a major technology provider, Japanese law still requires some financial transactions to be documented in paper. The stock exchanges in the three smaller centres have been demutualised for a fairly long time; the TSE only did so at the end of 2001.
The third impediment is that there is a sense among market participants that the price mechanism in Japanese financial markets is unusually opaque for a major market. The authorities are thought to be more likely to intervene in stock and bond markets through 'price-keeping operations'. And there is concern that some market participants, notoriously the Japanese broking houses, may try to manipulate the market for commercial or political gain. This latter effect is diminishing because foreign access to the Japanese financial system is increasing, notably through liberalisation of funds management.
In looking for ways to improve the functioning of their financial markets, institutions and systems, regional policymakers are wary of looking to, and relying on, Japan. Japan, also, is absorbed by its own domestic economic and financial difficulties. This puts the onus on the other developed economies in the region to provide capacity building.
This also has implications for China. China's own markets and institutions are undeveloped and it faces many serious difficulties.
33 But China's financial markets and institutions are being transformed and accession to the WTO will put substantial pressure on it to institute a marketconforming financial sector. Looking forward, if financial reform and development are successful in China, then that country will play a major role in finance in East Asia. It is particularly important for the rest of the region to engage now with Chinese policymakers and market practitioners to ensure that China's markets and institutions develop in a way that is consistent with full financial development elsewhere in East Asia.
Directions in Future Work
Financial development and integration are still in their early days in East Asia. There is considerable work now being done on regional finance. There are two components that warrant further policy and academic work.
The first is a comprehensive and critical stocktake of capacity building and cooperation in the finance domain. This would cover two elements. There are many sources of training and technical and policy assistance provided to the region in finance -like the IMF, ADB, World Bank, SEACEN and EMEAP working groups. These are valuable and important institutions but we need a fair comparative evaluation of these to understand and assess all the various forms in which 33 See Drysdale and Huang (2003) . capacity building is delivered. A lot is provided. Is it effective? Who does better? There is also a need for detailed intensive market-by-market study of legal frameworks, market practices, crossborder restrictions and the like in regional financial markets.
The second area that warrants focus is how regional policymakers explicitly engage with market participants in the financial sector. Such engagement is important in three respects. It is a vehicle for knowledge transfer from the private sector to officials in the region. Regulators are always on the back foot when it comes to knowing and understanding what the market is doing. Second, it establishes relationships and mechanisms for market practitioners to talk with the official sector. This does not matter so much in ordinary times but it can be crucial in minimizing the spread or effects of a financial crisis. 34 Third, it acts as a discipline on policymakers and politicians.
CONCLUSION
In January 2002, Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi spoke in Singapore about his vision for an East Asian Community, spanning China, Japan and Korea, the ASEAN-10 countries, and Australia and New Zealand. This is one powerful example of the vision of many in the region for a more integrated and cohesive East Asia. One element that is discussed in this context is the scope for developing and integrating the region's financial markets. There is scope for doing this, but it is a big job and requires commitment, capacity building and cooperation. In general, financial markets in the region are undeveloped and inefficient, and financial institutions are weak. Finance in East Asia does not underpin economic growth and development to the degree it should, leaving economies vulnerable to adverse economic and financial shocks. The work agenda on financial development and integration in East Asia will remain a full and rich one for many years to come.
